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Private Federal Tax Rulings Are Governed by Standard of
Equality and Fairness of Internal Revenue Code, Section
7805 (b )-International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States*
In a private ruling the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that cettain computers produced by Remington Rand, International Business Machines' sole competitor in the manufacture of
that type of computer, were not subject to a previously imposed
excise tax.1 IBM immediately requested a similar ruling concerning

• 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl.), rehearing denied, - F.2d - (Ct. Cl. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as principal case].
I. INT. REv. ConE 0'1! 1954, § 4191 (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3406(a)(6)).
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its identical machines. After a- 2½-year delay, the Commissioner
ruled adversely on IBM's request and at the same time prospectively
withdrew the favorable ruling from Remington.2 IBM thereupon
sued to recover the tax paid during the period Remington enjoyed
the exemption.3 The Court of Claims held, one judge dissenting,
that when two taxpayers ask for identical private rulings, but the
Commissioner rules favorably only as to one, the Commissioner
abuses the discretion granted to him by section 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code4 if he later reinstates the tax as to the favored
taxpayer prospectively only, without refunding to the other taxpayer the taxes paid during the period of discrimination.
The Commissioner. of Internal Revenue regularly issues private
rulings to individual taxpayers who request an interpretation of
the Internal Revenue Code as it applies to their particular fact
situations. 5 These rulings do not have the status of law; rather,
they are designed to enable the Commissioner to reflect his current
opinion regarding the tax Iaw. 6 A ruling embodying an incorrect
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code is considered a mere
nullity. A subsequent ruling promulgating the correct interpretation retroactively supersedes its erroneous predecessor, absent some
special statutory provision othenvise, for, in the absence of such a
provision, the Commissioner lacks the power to deviate from the
statute.7 Because of the potential retroactive effect of a corrective
ruling, it is immediately apparent that the holders of discredited
private_ rulings who have refrained from paying taxes in reliance
upon their rulings might well owe substantial sums to the government. To remedy this inequity,8 Congress enacted section 7805(b)
2. It is not disputed that IBM's machines are properly within the scope of § 4191.
Principal case at 917.
,
3. IBM's right to recover that portion of the excise tax passed on to its customers
was conditional upon its obtaining the consent of those customers in accordance with
the provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6416(a)(l).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(b) provides: "Retroactivity of regulations or
rulings.-The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which
any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied
without retroactive effect."
5. Rev. Proc. 28, 1962-2 Cu11r. BULL. 496, 497. A "private" ruling should be distinguished from a "published" ruling, the latter being published in the Revenue
Bulletin for the benefit and use of taxpayers at large.
6. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 135 (1936).
7. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1921); S. REP. No. 275, 67th
, Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1921), which states that the Act of November 23, 1921, § 1314,
42 Stat. 314 (the predecessor of § 7805(b)), "authorizes the Commissioner [to issue] a
regulation or Treasury decision which reverses a prior regulation or Treasury decision
.•• without retroactive effect." ("Rulings" were later included within this discretionary
power by the Act of May 10, 1934, § 506, 48 Stat. 757.) Sec H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1939); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1939), explaining
~at the. Commissioner is to use this discretion to avoid inequity where it would
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of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides the Commissioner
with discretionary authority to forego retroactive application of
corrective interpretations. Generally, however, when the Commissioner issues rulings reversing earlier favorable private rulings, nonretroactive treatment is made available under section 7805(b) only
to the holders of the favorable private rulings, and not to taxpayers
relying upon private rulings issued to others.9
In the principal case the Court of Claims, unable to find ~ore
appropriate statutory language to support its result, resorted to a
rathe~ imaginative application of section 7805(b).10 Although IBM
had never held a favorable private ruling on this matter, the court
nevertheless allowed recovery, reasoning that IBM, having taken the
trouble to apply promptly for its own ruling, was entitled to the
same treatment that its competitor, Remington, had received.11 Howotherwise occur if a new interpretation were applied "to past transactions which have
been closed by taxpayers upon existing practice."
At present, the general policy of the Internal Revenue Service is not to revoke
a private ruling retroactively except in certain rare circumstances. Rev. Proc. 28,
1962·2 CuM, BULL. 496, 505; Rev. Rul. 164, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 88, 91. The courts
have enforced this policy, holding that the Commissioner may be found to have abused
the discretion vested in him by § 7805(b) when he retroactively revokes a favorable
private ruling upon which the holder has relied. See, e.g., Lesavoy Foundation v.
Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956). See also Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957), which held that the Commissioner cannot be
equitably ·estopped to apply retroactively a revocation of a ruling when the original
ruling embodied a mistake of law, but that the Commissioner's action may be disturbed if he abuses the discretion vested in him by § 379l(b) (the predecessor of
§ 7805(b)). See generally Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as
Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX ~- REv.
487 (1964).
9. Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 686 (1962); Bornstein v. United
States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Minchin v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir.
1964); Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959); Goodstein v. Commissioner,
267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959); Gerstell v. Commissioner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ~ 62181
(1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. l!l63); Arnold A. Schwartz, 40 T.C. 191 (1963); Bennet
v. Commissioner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ~ 60253 (1960). Where taxpayers without private
ruliugs have alleged discrimination because they were not given the same favorable
treatment accorded similarly situated taxpayers with private rulings, the courts have
denied relief, holding that the fact a taxpayer secured a ruling is, in itself, a sufficient
basis for allowing preferential treatment. Weller v. Commissioner, supra; Arnold A.
Schwartz, supra (by implication).
10. The court apparently felt it necessary to base recovery on statutory grounds
in order to alleviate IBM's burden of showing damages, a burden which the court
implied would have to be imposed if it were to resort to "principles of estoppel
evolved judicially as part of a limited 'common law' effort to further fairness." Principal
case at 925.
11. Principal case at 924. In Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. CI.
1965), handed down by the Court of Claims one month after the principal case, the
plaintiff neglected to request a private ruling and therefore lost the case: "In [International Business Machines Corp. v. United States] •.. the court applied Section 7805(b)
·, •• in behalf of a taxpayer who had made prompt application to obtain a private ruling to the same effect as a ruling issued to another taxpayer, which manufactured and
sold business machines that were similar in all material respects to the machines
manufactured by plaintiff. In [Bornstein v. United States] ••• , none of the taxpayers
••• asked for rulings." Id. at 564 n.2.
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ever, because IBM's request for a private ruling holding its computers nontaxable was never granted, there was never a threat to
IBM that a subsequent ruling would retroactively impose a tax not
previously levied. IBM paid the tax throughout the period in question, and the Commissioner's later ruling merely articulated the
assumption upon which both IBM and the Service had been acting
-that IBM's computers were taxable. The court seems to have arbitra;ily assumed, however, that the ruling rejecting IBM's application for an exemption was somehow "retroactive."12 The court then
proceeded to find that the Commissioner had abused his discretion
under section 7805(b) because he did not make this ruling nonretroactive like the ruling reinstating the tax upon Remington.18 Although the court devised what it felt to be an adequate basis for
the application of section 7805(b), the statute is simply not constructed to provide a general means of recovery where the Commissioner's refusal to grant a favorable private ruling results in
discrimination. 14 As previously indicated, application of section
7805(b) is wholly dependent upon an eventual adverse private
ruling which may be construed to have retroactive effect; there is
no necessary correlation, however, between retroactive effect and
arbitrary discrimination. 111 If, for example, the Commissioner, instead
12. Principal case at 921. The court's conclusion seems to be that all adverse rulings,
regardless of whether they reflect a change in the Commissioner's interpretation of
the tax laws, are "retroactive" unless the Commissioner makes them "nonretroactive"
by refunding truces paid prior to the issuance of the ruling.
13. The Commissioner was forced to make the ruling as to Remington Rand
nonretroactive, because the Revenue Act of 1926, § 1108(b), 44 Stat. 9, 114, forbids the
levying of a true on any article sold if at the time of sale there was a ruling holding
the sale nontaxable.
14. Two cases were cited by the court for the proposition that recovery of back
taxes is allowed if the Commissioner makes a ruling retroactive as to the plaintifftaxpayer, but nonretroactive as to others without a rational basis for the distinction.
Exchange Parts Co. v. United States, 279 F.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1960); Connecticut Ry. &
Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct. Cl. 1956). However, both are distinguishable from the principal case because each involved a reversal by the Commissioner of a tax exemption policy applicable to the public at large, rather than a refusal
to grant a private ruling. Unlike the plaintiffs in both of the cited cases, IBM never
fell within the reach of any expression by the Service holding its products nontaxable,
15. The principal case leaves unanswered the further question whether, in the
absence of a reply by the Commissioner, IBM might have brought an action for man•
damus or mandatory injunction in a federal district court to compel the Commissioner
to issue a ruling. The only possible limitation upon the Commissioner's discretionary
right to refuse to issue a ruling seems to lie within the language of § 7805(a) of the Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, which authorizes the Commissioner to issue "needful" rules and
regulations. Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 81, 109 (1964). Nevertheless, since the language is
that of authorization and not of requirement, it fa tloubtful that a court would hold
that it embodies any limitation upon the Commissioner's discretion to refuse to rule,
Ibid. Furthermore, at least one court has held that a refusal to issue a declaratory order
is not a final order susceptible to review. United Pipe Line v. FPC, 203 F.2d 78 (5th
Cir. 1953). Finally, courts have historically been reluctant to issue writs of mandamus
in discretionary areas. See generally Davis, Mandatory Relief From Administrative
Action in the Federal Courts, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 585 (1955). The author of the Note,
113 U. PA. L. R.Ev., supra, suggests that as an alternative a trucpayer could go before
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of waiting 2½ -years, had promptly rejected IBM's request for· a
private ruling but continued to offer Remington favorable treatment,
or if the Commissioner had simply refused to rule, there would
appear to be no basis upon which to argue that IBM had been
subjected to the retroactive effects of a ruling, yet IBM would have
been subjected to discriminatory taxation.
By allowing IBM to recover because Remington had received
a favorable private ruling, the Court of Claims has established an
exception to the general concept that a private ruling affects only
the taxpayer to whom it is issued. 16 Consequently, the Commissioner
may find that by issuing a private ruling to a single individual, he
will become bound to numerous other taxpayers requesting similar
treatment. Such a result may be equitably sound, but before it is
too vigorously applauded courts should carefully consider its probable adverse effect on the pre-transactional guidance role of private
rulings.17 Because of high tax rates and the complexity of tax
statutes, taxpayers frequently hesitate to consummate important
business transactions without official assurance of the tax consequences.18 Therefore, a great number of requests for private rulings
are received by the Internal Revenue Service,19 and the necessity
for a prompt reply limits the scope of review allotted to each ruling,
thereby increasing the chance that an interpretation will be erroneous.20 If the effect of such errors is no longer to be limited solely to
the recipients of the erroneous rulings, the Service may not be as
willing to rule, particularly in the more difficult cases, where rulings
generally are of the greatest value.
To avoid posing this obstacle to the issuance of private rulings,
courts should require that the taxpayer alleging discrimination prove
more than that the Commissioner has not ruled favorably as to him
but has ruled favorably as to other taxpayers similarly situated. The
complaining taxpayer should further be required to show that the
the Tax Court and ask for a declaratory order under § 5(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1964). The effect of this approach would not be to compel the Commissioner to rule, but for the Tax Court itself
to rule upon the issue and thereby "remove uncertainty" created by the Commissioner's
refusal to rule.
16. See cases cited note 9 supra.
17. Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 1959); Caplin, Taxpayer
Rulings Policy of the" Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, N.Y.U.
20TH INsr. ON FED. TAX. 1, 26-29 (1962); Note, 113 u. PA. L. REv. 81, 108 (1964); cf.
Wolinsky v. United States, 271 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1959); Arnold A. Schwartz, 40
T.C. 191, 194 (1963).
18. Rev. Proc. 30, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 944; Caplin, supra note 17; Note, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 81, 84 (1964).
19. The Service receives about 30,000 to 40,000 requests annually. Caplin, supra
note 17, at 9.
20. Caplin, supra note 17; see Int. Rev. Service News Rel., May 21, 1964, 7 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. CCH 1f 6610.
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Commissioner's handling of his request was so careless or blatantly
arbitrary that equitable considerations clearly outweigh the need
for limiting application of the favorable rulings to their recipients.
However, since section 7805(b) is not designed to remedy discrimination, it offers no guarantee that the courts will impose the suggested
stringent burden. Thus, the responsibility for policing discriminatory rulings must be assumed by the Commissioner. It is to be
hoped that the Commissioner will take necessary precautions to
avoid discrimination caused by wholly unjustifiable delays in issuance of rulings like the 21/2-year delay to which IBM was subjected 21 -especially in cases where there is the possibility of a substantial excise tax discrepancy. 22 If administrative control does not
prove effective, section 7805 should be legislatively expanded to provide the judiciary with appropriate guidelines for remedying discriminatory dispensation of rulings. The expanded statute should
allow recovery where the taxpayer has, as in the principal case,
requested a ruling, and where the Commissioner's failure to issue a
favorable ruling results in discrimination which is both "intentional
and arbitrary."' 3

21. For example, the Commissioner might establish a policy that all delays of one
year will be ended by a favorable ruling.

22. The framers of the revised excise tax enacted as a part of the Revenue Act of
1932 adverted to the problem of competitive misalignment that could result from
uneven administration of the tax. The House Ways and Means Committee noted that
"it is of utmost importance that the tax be imposed and administered uniformly and
without discrimination." H.R. RP. No. 708, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 31, 32 (1932).
23. The Supreme Court requires that alleged instances of discriminatory state

taxation be intentional and arbitrary before the Court will find a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota
County, 260 U.S. 441, 447 (1923). See also Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326
U.S. 620, 623 (1946).

